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STRATEGIC REGULATORY PLANNING IN 
THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS 
Sheldon Kamieniecki and Steven A. Cohen 1 
The failureto coordinate policy formulation 
with policy implementation in hazardous 
waste regulation has hindered the identifi-
cation of potential obstacles to achieving 
compliance. In an effort to integrate policy 
formulation with implementation, this paper 
develops a strategic regulatory planning 
model and applies it to a specific case, the 
underground storage tank provision of the 
1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments. The final plan, submitted to the 
United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, emphasises 'induced compliance'. 
The study shows that the model provides 
policymakers with a practical tool for com-
bining policy formulation with implemen-
tation and identifying possible impediments 
to achieving compliance. 
Serious problems have resulted from a separation 
of policy formulation from policy implementation 
in hazardous materials regulation. In addition to 
wasted time, money, and effort. the bifurcation of 
the two policy processes has hindered the identifi-
cation of economic, political, and other obstacles 
to achieving compliance and controlling pollution. 
As a result, delays in the attainment of programme 
objectives have been common. The recent tend-
ency of Congress to transfer oversight responsi-
bility for hazardous waste regulation from the 
federal government to state and local government 
has added new potential roadblocks (Bowman, 
1984; Kamieniecki, O'Brien, and Clarke, 1986; 
Davis and Lester, 1987), and has made it even 
more critical to coordinate operationally policy 
formulation with policy implementation. 
Obviously, the failure to obtain compliance with 
hazardous waste laws threatens the nation's 
ronmental quality and, in many cases, the 
lic health (Cohen, 1986; Marcus, 1986). If 
kers possessed a well-defined model that 
them integrate policy formulation with 
implementation and identify possible regulatory 
impediments, they would be more likely to 
increase compliance rates and, in turn, environ-
mental quality. Accordingly, this paper introduces 
a strategic regulatory planning model for the 
design of regulatory programmes, and employs it 
in the development of an actual prog'ramme to 
administer a critical provision of the 1984 Haz-
ardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA), 
the regulation of underground storage tanks 
(USTs). As the results will show, the study 
provides policy-makers with a practical tool for 
linking policy formulation with implementation 
and overcoming potential obstacles to programme 
success. The paper begins with a discussion of 
hazardous waste policy. 
Hazardous waste policy 
The handling and disposal of hazardous materials 
is a major policy issue in the United States, Europe, 
and many other developed and developing 
countries. Based on the literature, how nations 
address this problem largely depends upon their 
political and governmental system. Coppock 
(1986), for example, analyses how chemical risk 
analysis is performed in the United States, West 
Germany, England, France, Sweden, and Japan. 
He finds that in all countries, except the United 
States, regulatory policy is legitimised through 
some form of consultation and negotiation among 
relevant groups. Thus, decisions come to reflect 
the collective wisdom of those involved. In the 
United States, however, policy is based on col-
lected evidence interpreted according to particular 
procedures. Instead of the administrative appeals 
and judicial challenges to each step in the process, 
which frequently occurs in the United States, the 
approaches of the other countries rely much more 
heavily on the positions of a small number of key 
individuals, many of whom are scientific and tech-
nical experts. Policy consensus rather than policy 
conflict is, therefore, more common in the 
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countries studied. When concern increases, the 
affected industry and government agencies con-
vene and decide upon the least disruptive course 
of action. The privatisation of American industry, 
of course, also adds tension and conflict to the 
decisionmaking process. 
Similarly, Brickman, Jasanoff, and ligen (1985) 
examine hazardous materials regulation in the 
United States, France, England, and West 
Germany. National policies are analysed in terms 
of: the legal and institutional framework; the 
structural and political characteristics of law-
making; the organisation and processes of admin-
istrative implementation; and the role of the courts. 
The researchers find that the fragmentation of pol-
itical power in the United States results in greater 
formality, judicial intervention, and potential for 
extended conflict than in its foreign counterparts. 
At the same time, patterns of cooperation, an in-
clination toward closed consultation, and less 
judicial review lead to less divergence between 
conflicting viewpoints and comparatively stable 
compromises in the European countries studied. 
In the United States, environmental regulatory 
programmes, if not most regulatory programmes, 
are often products of disjointed policymaking. 
Components of complex policy issues are ident-
ified, separated, categorised, and subjected to 
detailed analysis. A difficulty with this approach is 
that it sometimes focuses agencies on means and 
encourages them to lose sight of ends. Due to 
complexity, the 'whole' is so fragmented that 
policymakers and staff have little incentive to con-
sider the 'big picture'. Rather than worrying about 
whether a regulatory programme will allow an 
agency to reach a legislative goal, many policy-
makers strive to improve the efficiency of the 
implementation process. 
The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) hazardous waste regulatory 
programme is a case in point. As reflected in the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 
federal hazardous waste regulation was purely a 
paper exercise until 1983. For seven years EPA 
made numerous attempts to promulgate hazard-
ous waste rules under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act before finally succeeding. While 
these rules were being developed, hazardous 
waste remained unregulated by the federal 
government. Difficulties in promulgating regu-
lations stemmed from legal challenges to require-
ments and shifts in EPA policy. EPA's Office of 
Solid Waste became more concerned with getting 
the regulatory programme 'out the door and on the 
street' than with improvements in environmental 
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quality. Process and policy issues took precedence 
over implementation. 
.' 
As stated at the outset, this study incorporates 
strategic thinking into regulatory planning and 
injects a concern for implementation into plan-
ning. Regulatory planning, however, is a dis-
jointed and segmented process. Adding a concern 
for implementation cuts against the grain that 
establishes such policymaking practices in the 
first place. Nonetheless, it is advantageous for 
policymakers to address issues of feasibility prior 
to programme execution. Strategic regulatory 
planning is therefore potentially useful since it 
requires a concern for both the formulation and 
implementation of specific regulatory policies. 
Defining strategic regulatory planning 
According to Meier, 'Regulation is any attempt 
by the government to control the behaviour of 
citizens, corporations, or subgovernments' (1985, 
p. 1). Strategic regulatory planning is an effort by 
government to develop a comprehensive strategy 
or tactic for controlling behaviour. Hoffer and 
Schendel (1978) define strategy as the basic pat-
tern of current and planned resource deployments 
and environmental interactions that indicate how 
the organisation will achieve its objectives. In 
strategic regulatory planning the formal regulation 
itself is only one component among several avail-
able to control behaviour. Funding, technical 
assistance, exhortation, and publicity are examples 
of other techniques that can be used to influence 
the behaviour of regulated parties. Strategic 
planning seeks to place the promulgation offormal 
regulations within the context of other tools avail-
able to affect behaviour. In the broadest sense, a 
regulatory strategy projects the impact of govern-
ment action on the organisational environment of 
regulated parties. 
A model for strategic regulatory planning 
This section presents a model for strategic regulat-
ory planning. The model encourages policymakers 
to approach regulation through a tactical, ste 
step process and to link policy formulati 
implementation. The steps are derived 
schematic outline of political strategy 
tion developed by MacMillan and Jo 
Research conducted by Hoffer and 
(1978) was also helpful in identifying 
elements of the model. 
Figure 1 lists the seven major steps that 
be followed in designing an effective regu 
programme. Let us take a closer look at each 







IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
4. SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 
a. Mission/Objectives 
b. :Partyanalysis 
5. STRATEGIC REGULATION FORMULATION 
6. EXANTE REVIEW 
7. EX POST REVIEW/REVISION 
What is at issue? 
Who is involved? 
.' 
How have different levels of government and the parties 
involved responded to this issue in the past? 
Why? 
What outcomes are desired? 
What are the motivations, goals, positions, and resources 
of each party to either comply with, ignore, or fight the 
desired behavioural changes? 
Determination of the conditions in the regulated 
community, regulating agency, and the outside arena that 
affect the cost and level of coerciveness of alternative 
regulatory devices. The most appropriate devices are then 
chosen to influence target group behaviour and achieve 
compliance. 
Addresses the fit and feasibility of the regulatory plan 
before implementation. 
Following implementation, how successful has the 
regulatory plan been at modifying behavioljr? Is further 
modification needed? 
Figure 1 
A seven-step model for strategic regulatory planning 
1. Problem recognition This step serves to focus 
efforts on a clearly definable problem or issue, and 
to provide an introduction to the question at hand. 
Policymakers are encouraged to identify and 
examine the dynamics of the problem. Admittedly, 
there often is a lack of information or some degree 
of uncertainty at the outset. 
2. Identification of parties This step serves to 
identify all individuals and groups that are directly 
or indirectly involved in or affected by the problem. 
Among the primary classes of parties that should 
be examined are legislative parties (e.g. national 
and state legislatures), regulatory parties (e.g. 
national agencies, state agencies, and local 
officials), target groups, victim groups, and 
interested third parties. 
3. Historical analysis Policymakers are asked to 
gain an understanding of the past history and 
seriousness ofthe problem, as well as the effective-
ness of previous regulatory attempts at different 
levels of government. This step not only ensures 
that prior mistakes are avoided but, more import-
antly, identifies the underlying party motiva-
tions and external causes that precipitated prior 
regulatory failure. 
4. Situational analysis The situational analysis 
phase serves two purposes. First, it identifies, 
conceptually and operationally, the specific goals 
and desired outcomes. Second, it assesses the 
strengths, weaknesses, resources, and motivations 
of each party involved. From a tactical standpoint, 
policymakers attempt to predict the responses of 
each party to the regulatory stimulus as well as 
explain the motivations or reasons for responding 
in such a manner. Public choice theory might be 
helpful in this regard. Meetings, documents, and 
surveys can provide important data during this 
phase of the model. 
5. Strategic regulation formulation Many pol icy-
makers consider this step to be the most critical 
part of the process. Here, specific regulatory 
devices are selected and the actual regulatory 
programme takes shape. As the model implies, the 
more closely the selection of regulatory devices 
follows from and is consistent with the results of 
the analysis performed in the first four steps, the 
more likely the overall programme will be effective. 
Due to the importance of this stage, a conceptual 
framework for the selection of specific regulatory 
techniques is developed. 
In comparison to other policy areas, regulation 
has a distinct goal, namely compliance. In this 
study 'compliance', the dependent variable, means 
the degree to which members of a target group 
conform to the directives of an agency, court, 
legislative body, or some other governmental 
unit. 2 By definition, the regulatory process requires 
analysts to conceptualise outputs (products) and 
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Conditions in: 
The regulated community 
The regulating agency 
The outside arena 
Coerciveness of devices 
Noncoercion --+ Coercion 
--+ f-> 
Cost of devices to government 
Low cost --+ High cost 
The overall Level of compliance 
government ~voidance behaviour --+ Compliant behaviour 
effort f-> 
Figure 2 
A conceptual framework for the selection of regulatory devices 
outcomes (consequences) somewhat differently 
than in other policy domains (e.g. redistributive 
programmes) . 
In most cases, policymakers will want to steer the 
outcomes of regulatory efforts as close to com-
pliance as possible with the least amount of 
coercion and at the lowest financial cost to 
government. Usually, the most coercive tech-
niques (e.g. on-site inspections) will necessitate 
the greatest government involvement and will 
therefore be more expensive to oversee than the 
least coercive techniques (e.g. voluntary self-
regulation). The presence of certain conditions, 
however, will tend to influence how much 
coercion is required and at what cost. In theory, th~ 
adoption of the most expensive and restrictive 
regulatory devices should guarantee a high rate of 
compliance. Yet. as Marcus (1980) shows, certain 
conditions (e.g. a poor business climate) can force 
outcomes toward noncompliance for even very 
costly and coercive regulatory techniques. In 
other instances, other considerations might per-
mit the adoption of the least costly and coercive 
regulatory devices to achieve compliance. If envir-
onmental policymakers are to devise mechanisms 
to produce desired results, they must carefully read 
existing conditions and be alert to changes. 
The three sets of conditions that exist prior to 
implementation and that can influence the cost 
and coerciveness of regulatory devices necessary 
to induce compliance are those in the regulated 
community, regulating agency, and outside arena. 
In the regulated community, policymakers need to 
pay attention to such factors as the size and diver-
sity of the target population, the regulatory costs 
to target groups, amount of behavioural change 
required, ability to hide noncompliance, and 
risk preference. Among the conditions in the 
regulating agency that should be considered 
are the commitment of relevant actors, regula-
tory timetable, resources of the agency(ies) 
involved (including available funds, personnel, and 
expertise), and precision of the law. Examples of 
conditions in the outside arena include the political 
and economic climate, openness of the process, 
and decision structures and demand patterns. 
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Following an evaluation of the conditions sur-
rounding the issue area, policymakers can begin 
analysing alternative regulatory mechanisms. 
Regulatory devices tend to fall at different points 
along a continuum of coerciveness. In other words, 
devices intended to control behaviour tend to vary 
according to their restrictiveness. Non-coercive 
approaches (through self-regulation) occupy one 
end of the continuum while coercive approaches 
(through directcommand-and-control regulation) 
occupy the other end. Conceptualising regulation 
in these terms provides policymaker's with a flexible 
framework in which to study alternative regulatory 
techniques. 
Cost is a second dimension that characterises 
regulatory mechanisms. Cost refers to the amount 
of money government must spend to administer a 
particular regulatory approach. In general, as 
pointed out earlier, the most coercive activities 
(e.g. imprisoning polluters) require the greatest 
government involvement and therefore are more 
expensive to administer than the least coercive 
activities (e.g. economic incentives). Limited 
government revenues obviously make this an 
important variable. 
The total cost and coerciveness of the selected 
regulatory programme represents the overall 
government effort necessary to attain com-
pliance and control pollution. Compliance can 
be achieved in varying degrees and is best con-
ceptualised along a continuum ranging from 
avoidance to adherence. 
Figure 2 shows the relationships between different 
types of conditions, the non-coercion/coercion 
and low cost/high cost dimensions, overall 
government effort, and level of compliance. 
The conceptual framework presented in Figure 2 is 
nested in step five of the strategic regulatory plan-
ning model and, in conjunction with the previous 
stages, fosters a concern for implementation. In 
more general terms, it provides policymakers with 
a guide for formulating a regulatory plan to meet 
specific legislative goals, in this case, the UST 
provisions of HSWA. 
6. Ex ante review The ex ante review step 
addresses the fit and feasibility of the selected 
regulatory approach before implementation. This 
acts to avoid wasted effort, resources, and time 
spent in implementing a poor regulatory pro-
gramme by identifying potential trouble spots 
before it is too late. As flaws are singled out, 
policymakers should trace back through the 
strategic plan to the problem point and reformulate 
the regulatory programme using the modified 
knowledge base. 
7. Ex post review/revision At this stage policy-
makers determine the effectiveness of the regu-
latory programme after it has been implemented. 
Feedback and evaluation are used to assess pro-
gramme performance. The operational objectives 
identified in step four serve as the basis for com-
parison. Usually, the aim of revision (if required) 
will be increased compliance. 
The hazardous and solid waste amendments 
Congress expanded the scope of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act by enacting 
HSWA in 1984. This legislation regulates, for the 
first time, the owners and operators of over one 
million USTs. In contrast to previous American 
hazardous waste laws (e.g. Superfund), the regu-
lation of USTs was passed without any wide-
spread outcry from the public. Following the 
allegations of mismanagement in EPA's hazardous 
waste programme, Congress was searching for a 
vehicle to demonstrate that it was aggressively 
controlling toxic pollution. The revisions of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act became 
a forum for demonstrating Congress's new 'get 
tough' policy. 
HSWA is one of the most detailed pieces of 
environmental legislation ever written (Harris, 
Want and Ward, 1987). After battling over 
interpretations of environmental legislation dur-
ing the reign of EPA Administrator Ann Gorsuch-
Burford in the early 198Qs, Congress decided to 
leave nothing to chance. EPA was placed on tight 
schedules, and regulations were required to con-
form to detailed Congressional specifications. If 
EPA does not meet the deadlines for promulgating 
guidelines, Congress has included statutory 'ham-
mer clauses' in HSWA. For the first time Congress 
has issued regulations that will go into effect by 
a specified date unless EPA adopts its own regu-
lations. These 'regulations by statute' will most 
likely be much harsher than EPA's regulations. 
Thus, in order to avoid administrative delay, EPA 
has been encouraged to issue guidelines on time. 
Industry, in turn, understands that the result of 
contesting and delaying standards will be stricter 
standards. 
In addition to tightening up hazardous materials 
regulation, HSWA significantly expands the 
number of individuals and firms subject to regu-
lation. Prior to 1984, toxic-bearing municipal 
garbage dumps, small quantity generators of 
hazardous waste, and UST operators were not 
regulated by federal law. HSWA now places all 
those parties under federal control. 
The single most dramatic expansion of regulatory 
power is the provision of the law regulating USTs. 
Every gasoline station in America is now regulated 
under HSWA (Therefore, a consumer product, 
gasoline, and not a hazardous waste is the primary 
target of the legislation.) To comply with the law's 
edicts some tank owners will need to replace their 
tanks (at a cost ranging from $10.,0.0.0. to $1 0.0.,0.0.0.) 
and clean up tank leaks (at costs ranging into the 
millions). This authority was further expanded 
when Superfund was reauthorised in October 
1986. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthor-
isation Act requires owners of USTs to carry 
insurance and provides EPA with a 10.0. million 
dollar a year trust fund to pay the cost of abating 
tank leaks. The complexity and challenge of this 
regulatory task is staggering, primarily because 
of the large and diverse size of the target group. 
Tens of thousands of firms are included in the UST 
programme, and most of these firms are small 
businesses with unique problems and charac-
teristics. Management of the UST programme 
presents EPA with a formidable and nearly 
unprecedented challenge since it rarely has had 
to oversee a target population of this nature or 
magnitude. If EPA is to achieve adequate rates of 
compliance with the UST provisions, it will have to 
possess a well-defined model for the development 
of an overall regulatory programme.3 
The research project 
In December 1984, EPA's Office of Solid Waste 
and Emergency Response contracted with the 
National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) to analyse the long-range policy issues 
associated with HSWA. NAPA is a Congression-
ally-chartered membership organisation of nearly 
40.0. scholars and practitioners in public adminis-
tration. The investigation began as a wide-ranging 
assessment of the legislation's purpose and 
administrative problems, but quickly focused on 
the newly regulated parties, namely the owners of 
USTs and small quantity generators of hazardous 
waste. By the time the project was 10.0. days old, 
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however, it had principally become an effort to 
design a broad policy for regulating USTs. 
The Hazardous Waste Management Project was 
guided by a panel of six Academy members and 
three outside experts in different fields. A staff 
assisted the panel in its research, deliberations, 
and completion of additional work requested by 
EPA.4 Over 10 background papers and two major 
strategy papers were drafted during the study. 
Library sources, government documents, and 
comprehensive surveys of involved parties fur-
nished data for these papers (and the completion 
of the first four steps of the strategic regulatory 
planning model). Most of the background papers 
and both strategy papers were subjected to a 
thorough review by the panel and EPA manage-
ment. In addition, the panel met four times to 
formulate recommendations and hear presen-
tations by individuals from NAPA. EPA, interest 
groups, and industry. The final UST regulatory 
plan was unanimously supported by the Project's 
panel. 
The results 
The Hazardous Waste Management Project was 
conducted between 1985 and 1986. The strategic 
regulatory planning model introduced earlier was 
followed in the study. As steps one through four 
require, the research staff collected a great deal of 
information on different facets of America's UST 
problem. The results of the entire investigation are 
summarised below. 
1. Problem recognition Almost one-third of 
America's underground tanks are leaking because 
they are old and unprotected against corrosion. 
Many leaking USTs may pose serious risks to the 
environment, particularly to aquifers, and public 
health (Feticiano, 1984; US EPA. 1985). Benzene 
and ethyl dibromide, two components of gasoline, 
are suspected carcinogens. Releases from USTs 
also can contaminate surface water and can lead to 
fire and explosions. 
2. Identification of parties More than three 
million active and abandoned gasoline storage 
tanks are buried underground in the United States 
(Blodgett and Copeland, 1985). From 600,000 to 
700,000 tanks are located at over 200,000 retail 
gasoline outlets across the United States. It is 
estimated that about 50% of these are owned 
by major oil companies; determining ownership 
status for the other half is difficult. Some belong 
to automobile and truck rental companies and 
automobile, truck, and taxi fleets. Others are 
owned by different levels of government. Roughly 
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100,000 tanks contain materials other than 
gasoline (e.g. chemicals). 
3. Historical analYSIS Prior to the passage of 
HSWA, federal legislation did not adequately 
regulate USTs. The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act regulates tanks which contain 
hazardous wastes but not tanks with petroleum or 
other hazardous products. However, California, 
Dade County in Florida (Miami), Suffolk County 
in New York (Long Island). and Barnstable 
County in Massachusetts (Cape Cod) -all areas 
heavily dependent upon groundwater - devel-
oped programmes to clean up and prevent leaks 
from both petroleum and chemical tanks prior to 
1984. An ad hoc tank coalition - consisting of 
the American Petroleum Institute, the Steel Tank 
Institute, the National Oil Jobbers Council, and 
the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers-
argued that the UST problem should be studied 
further before passage of federal legislation. Yet 
increased publicity concerning groundwater con-
tamination, coupled with EPA's refusal to appro-
priate money for hazardous waste site cleanup in 
the early 1980s, placed pressure on Congress and 
President Reagan to enact HSWA. 
4. Situational analysis Subtitle I of HSWA 
requires EPA to develop a comprehensive pro-
gramme for the regulation of USTs 'as may be 
necessary to protect human health and the 
environment' (S.9003(a)). Specific provisions of 
the law concern notification, interim prohibition, 
new tank standards, monitoring and reporting 
standards for existing tanks, corrective actions, 
financial responsibility, inspection and enforce-
ment, and state authorisation. As noted earlier, 
innovative statutory 'hammer clauses' were 
included to minimise delay by EPA and industry. 
The positions and possible activities of tank 
manufacturers, small businesses, major oil com-
panies, trade associations, the insurance industry, 
and state and local government agencies were 
reviewed at this juncture of the study. Research 
identified potential obstacles to achieving com-
pliance, which included the nature ofthe regulated 
community, political support for regulating USTs, 
the availability of liability insurance, inadequate 
information, and the deadlines and ambiguities 
contained in the statute itself. 
5, Strategic regulation formulation The data 
and information collected in the first four steps of 
the model provided a foundation for pursuing step 
five. Following the framework in Figure 2, the 
research staff evaluated the conditions in the regu-
lated community, regulating agency, and outside 
arena that might affect the cost and coerc 
of regulatory devices necessary for achieving com-
pliance. Among the regulatory devices analysed 
were market solutions and economic incentives, 
insurance programmes, self-regulation, taxes and 
fees, reporting and compliance tracking, licensing, 
permits, standard setting, setting penalties, 
inspections, adjudication, education, information 
disclosure, and the use of the media. 
After considering all the constraints and potential 
obstacles to regulating USTs, the Project panel 
and research staff recommended that EPA adopt a 
strategic regulatory plan that emphasises 'induced 
compliance' (NAPA, 1986). There was a general 
belief that methods to induce compliance 
should be multi-faceted. As a consequence, the 
regulatory programme contained three principal 
components: stimulate voluntary compliance, 
stimulate private enforcement by requiring lia-
bility insurance and/or financial assurance, and 
implement tactical and selective high visibility 
enforcement procedures against violators. By sug-
gesting that EPA stimulate voluntary compliance, 
the study team was calling for the agency to do all 
it could to encourage regulated parties to learn 
about tank standards, understand how those stan-
dards apply to their operations, and take steps to 
comply voluntarily with the law's requirements. 
To help promote voluntary compliance the panel 
and staff suggested that EPA develop education, 
technical assistance, and financial assistance pro-
grammes. The desire on the part of UST owners to 
prevent the loss of a valued product (gasoline) 
should facilitate the implementation of this part of 
the plan. 
The second component of 'induced compliance' 
was based on the expectation that voluntary com-
pliance would never be total and that some degree 
of coercion would be necessary. The panel urged 
the EPA to enforce aggressively the requirement 
that UST owners prove that they have the financial 
capability to abate tank leaks and pay for associ-
ated damages. It was hoped that an insurance 
requirement might stimulate a self-policing system 
based on insurance company interest in minimis-
ing and stabilising risk and on tank owner interest 
in obtaining insurance at the least possible cost. 
Specifically, EPA's role would be to ensure that 
tank owners actually carry some type of insurance, 
investigate tank leaks that have not been fixed, 
and enforce the law when self-regulation fails. 
Apparently, Congress also saw the potential value 
of requiring insurance when it enacted the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorisation Act soon 
after the final strategic regulatory plan had been 
submitted to EPA by NAPA. 
I n suggesting the adoption of the third component 
of the 'induced compliance' approach, the panel 
and staff assumed that the other two components 
would not be comprehensive enough and viola-
tions of the law would occur. Voluntary, self-
policed compliance can be stimulated with a 
credible enforcement threat. Due to limited 
resources (in terms of budget and staff), such a 
threat will only be credible if it is selective and 
certain. The panel and staff believed that the 
United States Internal Revenue Service's model of 
explicit, visible, and statistically selective inspec-
tion (or audit) was worth imitating in the regu-
lation of USTs. Even though only a tiny portion of 
the nation's taxpayers are audited each year, most 
taxpayers believe that there is a real chance they 
may be selected. If a similar perception could also 
be nurtured among tank owners, the probability of 
compliance should be enhanced. 
The recommended strategic regulatory plan was 
built on the understanding that government's 
regulatory activities can range from assisting 
voluntary compliance to active and vigorous 
enforcement. As explained before, these are two 
ends of what can be termed a non-coercive/ 
coercive continuum. In the case of regulating 
USTs, the idea was to adopt a mix of coercive 
and non-coercive mechanisms that were cost-
effective and that promote compliance. 
6. Ex ante review Throughout the early 1980s, 
insurance companies reduced offerings or drama-
tically increased the price of certain types of 
liability insurance. As a result, municipalities, 
medical doctors, environmental facilities, and 
other organisations faced serious difficulties 
obtaining insurance. In 1985, environmental 
liability insurance became particularly difficult to 
purchase. 
Clearly, it is beyond EPA's jurisdiction to alleviate 
the liability insurance crisis. If insurance is unavail-
able, this particular component of the 'induced 
compliance' regulatory approach cannot be fully 
employed. Even if the insurance problem can be 
resolved, it is difficult to expect the insurance 
industry to cover every tank that is currently 
leaking. 
For EPA to implement successfully this compo-
nent of the plan, the insurance problem needs to be 
solved. The panel and staff recommended that 
EPA work with Congress to address the issue of 
tort liability (NAPA, 1986). They advocated that 
either liability limits or some type of regulatory 
mechanism should be considered to assure the 
availability of reasonably priced environmental 
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insurance. The Agency was also advised to work 
with the insurance industry to overcome technical 
uncertainties regarding risk prediction. EPA could 
help identify low-risk and high-risk tanks to 
facilitate risk-based insurance pricing. 
Furthermore, EPA was advised to back up the 
insurance requirement with a strong administra-
tive mechanism for monitoring compliance. For 
tanks that are uninsurable, the panel and staff 
suggested that EPA work with the states to 
develop assigned risk pools or Superfund-type fee 
systems to pay the cost of cleanup. Such a mixed 
public-private insurance system might assure that 
all tank leak cleanups have a source of funding. 
The key challenge to EPA in implementing this 
approach was to keep insurance companies in the 
market and competitive. A second challenge was 
to induce these companies to monitor tank man-
agement practices and structure insurance rates 
according to risk. The panel and staff were aware 
of the difficulty of accomplishing these goals 
but considered them worthy of significant effort 
(NAPA, 1986).6 
Moreover, beginning in 1988, states are eligible to 
apply for authorisation from EPA to operate a UST 
programme in lieu ofthe federal programme. (Until 
then enforcement is a federal responsibility.) Thus, 
EPA's primary role is to prepare state and local 
governments for their lead role in enforcing under-
ground tank regulations. In order to ensure that 
state and local governments assume this function, 
the panel and staff advised EPA to stimulate 
public support for enforcement efforts. They also 
suggested that EPA provide state and local 
governments with guidance on inspection and 
litigation procedures and with limited grant 
funding to seed state efforts. In addition, it was 
recommended that the Agency playa clearing-
house role in exchanging case development 
lessons and emerging precedents. Finally, the 
panel and staff advised EPA to take the lead 
in publicising enforcement efforts in order to 
build the regulated community's perception that 
violators would be punished. 
EPA was advised to work actively to generate 
public support for the enforcement of UST pro-
visions for a second reason. Enforcement directed 
against small businesses run by 'average' people 
entails different political risks than enforcement 
against larger, 'faceless' corporations. It is easy for 
a federal regulatory agency to appear unreason-
able when suing small businesses. It is important, 
therefore, to select initial enforcement targets 
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carefully and to make certain that the Agency's 
case against the violator is clearly communicated 
to the public. " 
7. Ex post review and revision This last phase of 
the planning process takes place after implemen-
tation has begun and enough experience has been 
gained to gauge the success of the programme. 
There are three purposes for this review: (1) To 
assess the degree to which implementation has 
conformed to the original design; (2) To assess the 
adequacy and current relevance of the original 
plan; and (3) To suggest mid-course corrections in 
the regulatory programme. Since the EPA has had 
little time to adopt and implement the plan, it will 
be difficult to draw definitive conclusions about 
the overall success of the programme, especially 
where rates of compliance are concerned. In fact, 
accurate data on level of compliance in each state 
may not be available for a number of years. The 
discussion, therefore, focuses on the first two 
objectives and not on the third one. 
The original organisation structure of the new 
Office of Underground Storage Tanks closely 
adhered to the panel and staff's recommendation. 
Initially, one of the new office's two units was a 
branch designed to focus on implementation 
issues. EPA's intention to focus on these type of 
issues was reinforced by a major reorganisation of 
the Office of Underground Storage Tanks in the 
spring of 1987. With the passage of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorisation Act in 1986 
and the establishment of a UST trust fund, a third 
branch was added to the Office of Underground 
Storage Tanks devoted to administering the fund. 
It soon became apparent, however, that the 
corrective action or cleanup effort had been 
divided into two parts that needed to be combined. 
The functions of preventing tank leaks and enforc-
ing private cleanup of tank leaks were in one unit. 
The function of trust fund-financed cleanups was 
coordinated by a second unit. The addition of a 
trust fund branch created a hybrid structure. Two 
of the three branches were organised by functions 
(policy development and implementation), while 
one was organised by legislation (the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorisation Act). The func-
tion of implementing the regulatory aspects of the 
programme would benefit by combining them 
with the resources and high-level attention 
generated by the trust fund. For that and other 
reasons, the Office of Underground Storage 
Tanks was restructured into a Policy Division, an 
Implementation Division, and a Deputy Director 
for Programme Management. This reorganisation 
allowed the office to continue its effort to 
concentrate on implementation activities. 
From July through October 1986, the Office of 
Underground Storage Tanks developed a pro-
gramme budget for the 1987 financial year.6 The 
Programme Budget of the Office of Underground 
Storage Tanks described the organisation's objec-
tives and activities for the 1987 financial year and 
summarised spending and personnel allocations 
for each of 75 proposed projects. More than half of 
the office's contract funding (53.2%) and over 
one third of its staff time (35.8%) was allo-
cated to implementation. Regulation development 
received about a quarter of the organisation's per-
sonnel (25.4%) and contract funding (29.1 %). 
These figures are particularly striking in a 
new regulatory organisation where presumably a 
number of new regulations must be promulgated 
before implementation can even begin. The 
Programme Budget is another indication of the 
intention of the Office of Underground Storage 
Tanks to link policy formulation with implemen-
tation, a key objective of the strategic regulatory 
planning model. 
If budgets and organisational structures reflect 
organisational behaviour, one can conclude that 
the Office of Underground Storage Tanks has 
adhered to one of the basic principles of the 
strategic regulatory plan; the emphasis on induc-
ing compliance. However, the plan contained 
additional recommendations. The panel and staff 
also suggested that EPA work closely with interest 
groups to encourage compliance, require tank 
insurance, and strategically enforce tank laws. The 
Agency has begun an active programme of interest 
group relations. Yet, with the passage of the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorisation Act, 
Congress (and not EPA) required owners of USTs 
to have insurance. As time goes on, EPA plans to 
involve state and local governmental entities in a 
coordinated effort to verify that tank owners and 
operators are complying with the law. 
The difference between the panel and staff's 
recommendations and actual EPA behaviour was 
due to deliberate policy or management choices, 
the effect of EPA standard practices, and changed 
conditions. There was also a fair measure of simple 
inattention to the recommendations. Initially, 
the Office of Underground Storage Tanks decided 
to emphasise programme development before 
implementation and devoted most of its resources 
to designing the programme. In large measure this 
meant developing the regulations and guidelines 
needed to begin the programme. Insurance for 
USTs was not required because the Office of 
Underground Storage Tanks decided to first con-
duct a study of its availability and utility before 
mandating it. Before the issue was fully studied by 
the office, however, Congress decided to require 
insurance. 
Conclusion 
This paper introduced a strategic regulatory plan-
ning model for use in the management of hazard-
ous materials. The model presented in this study 
contained seven steps and was applied in the 
design of a strategic regulatory plan for the admin-
istration of the UST provisions of HSWA. The 
model's simple, straightforward approach should 
facilitate its use in other hazardous waste pro-
grammes, and perhaps in other areas of regulation 
(e.g. transportation safety and consumer protec-
tion). While the model was applied at the start of a 
new regulatory programme, nothing about the 
model necessarily prevents it from being' adopted 
at any point in a regulatory effort. It should be 
noted, of course, that much of the strategy of any 
public programme is already included in its 
enabling legislation. 
The perspective taken in strategic regulatory 
planning runs counter to general tendencies in 
regulatory policymaking. In contrast to common 
practices, strategic regulatory planning necessi-
tates the collection of substantial amounts of 
data and information regarding the circumstances 
surrounding a given issue. Rather than being dis-
jointed and remedial, strategic regulatory planning 
emphasises rapid institutional learning. Lessons 
learned are factored into policymaking as rapidly 
as possible. This process is characterised by 
continuous feedback, evaluation, and correction, 
with progress (i.e. increased compliance) as the 
objective. In this sense, policymakers are urged to 
set realistic goals, and attempt to build slowly 
effective ways of reaching those goals. They are 
encouraged to move toward solutions rather than 
away from problems, but are not encouraged to 
believe that a single master plan can ever be used 
to accomplish a broad aim. 
In summary, strategic planning requires policy-
makers to take a tactical approach in developing 
regulatory programmes. They are encouraged to 
study carefully the entire policy context before 
deciding upon a course of action. The crafting of 
good public policies necessitates consideration of 
all facets of the problem without prejudice. The 
model introduced in this study, while far from 
being perfect, encourages policymakers to do 
exa ctl y th at. 
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NOTES 
1. The authors are involved in a series of research 
projects on this subject. The order in which their 
names appear is rotated. 
2. As will soon become evident. it is assumed that com-
pliance by polluters leads to improved environmental 
quality. 
3. See Harris, Want and Ward (1987) for a compre-
hensive explanation and interpretation of HSWA 
4. Cohen was the Director of the Project and 
Kamieniecki served as a Senior Research Consultant. 
5. See NAPA (1986) for an in-depth analysis of the UST 
insurance issue. Also, consult Ferreira (1982) about 
the use of insurance as a regulatory tool. 
6. Cohen worked closely with the Office of Under-
ground Storage Tanks to develop this programme 
budget. However, he was no longer associated with 
NAPA by this time. 
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